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Robert Hall opened the discussion with a comparison of this model to
Grossman‐Stiglitz. He felt that there should be some serious discussion
of trading costs. He noted the large profits that could be made by hold-
ing an optimal carry trade portfolio. However, he pointed out that the
cost of maintaining the position that generates that favorable Sharpe
ratio would be nontrivial since one would have to update the portfolio
continuously. As he stated, “You really need to be a specialist to not be
eaten alive at maintaining these positions.” Markus Brunnermeier
agreed that in the earlier sample, the trading costs were high, but since
it is now the case that one can trade exchange traded funds (ETFs)
based on interest rates, the trading costs have decreased. However, it
is the case that because of a high Sharpe ratioand a lowvolatility, traders
want to take leveraged positions on the carry trade, which does increase
the cost of keeping an optimal portfolio in this particular market.
John Campbell suggested that it would be interesting to combine the
conditional approach they take in this paper with the perspective of a
diversified carry trade. He wondered how the weights of a diversified
carry trade portfolio should be adjusted over time to get even better
returns. This paper presents a number of ideas, such as varying the
weights with the interest rate differential itself or seeing whether the
amount of crash insurance one should buy varies with the price of crash
insurance. These questions are of particular interest to hedge funds but
maybe only increase the puzzle to academics. For an explanation,
Campbell believed that one has to think of a world in which investors
are heterogeneous and only some have the expertise to undertake the
carry trade. These investors tend to be in large financial institutions
which are already short volatility; for example, it is known that invest-
ment banks tend to lose money when the market volatility index, VIX,
goesup.Therefore,Campbellproposedacovarianceexplanationbetween
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thought that the VIX is important because it is a good proxy for that mar-
ginal utility of these arbitrageurs.
Xavier Gabaix wondered if the results of the paper are the essence of
a phenomenon or just a corrective term. He gave an example of the
wheat market: because the supply and demand of food vary a lot,
thepriceofwheatisveryvolatile.Arbitrageurssmooththepriceofwheat
to some degree and take future positions on wheat. It is surely the case
that when the arbitrageurs have lost money, then the price of futures is
loweror the price of puts is higher. Thus when the VIX is high,since they
are part of the same diversified debt, the price of puts and calls on wheat
will be higher. All of this is correction around the fundamental volatility
of the price of wheat. This could also very well be the case for the cur-
rency market. Because the R
2 between the VIX and the futures positions
of the currencies are all very low, Gabaix said that he does not know
whether the covariance is the institutional descriptions of the corrections
or of something else (as described in the paper). Nagel, in response,
pointed out that since the authors’ regressions use weekly data, the
R
2’s of the regressions are expected to be low, as are any regressions that
use short‐term stock data. However, this does not exclude the possibility
of Gabaix’s alternative view of corrections.
John Cochrane then made a few comments. First, it seemed to him
thattheskewnessinthiscaseseemsalotlikeapesoproblemwheresome
of the floating currencies are acting like pegged currencies. If so, these
pesoproblemsshouldshowupinstandarderrorsandinbiases.Hethere-
fore wondered how much the skewness lowers the profits and widens
the standard error. Second, in response to Hall’s comment of trade costs,
he suggested that the trade costs are actually not very high due to the
slow‐moving nature of interest rates. The optimal carry trade portfolios
would require putting money into high interest rate currencies. Relative
interest rates last for years, and it is not something that would need to be
changed on a daily or hourly basis.
Daron Acemoglu talked about the general approach to asset‐pricing
problems. In this context, he was uncomfortable with the standard Lu-
cas tree approach of taking the returns process as exogenous and then
examining optimal holdings and pricing behavior given this process.
Andrew Atkeson agreed with Acemoglu and gave an example of
why it might not make sense to model the risk as exogenous in this
process. When the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)
went to the euro, it completely eliminated the profits of the carry trade
in Europe, and he guessed that if the EMU broke the euro again into
Discussion 386individual currencies that the profits of the carry trade would be rein-
stated. In this way, the carry trade risk is largely under the control of
monetary arrangements so clearly not exogenous.
Kenneth Rogoff was curious about whether the empirical facts from
25 years ago would look very different than those from the present. Fi-
nancial markets have deepened and monetary institutions have changed
a lot, yet his intuition was that the skewness would still be found.
Olivier Blanchard was convinced by the authors’ explanation of the
UIP puzzle through liquidity and funding constraints. However, he felt
that origin of these constraints remained unclear. While the authors
mentioned agency problems, their remarks on the price of insurance
implied that there may be something more at work. When investments
are going well, money comes into the carry trade, and when they are
going poorly, the constraints tighten. Blanchard suggested that this has
the appearance of behavioral finance rather than funding constraints
in the usual sense. Brunnermeier responded that it is behavioral finance
in the sense that it is a story about the limits to arbitrage. However, it still
can be modeled as a principal‐agent problem where all the agents are
behaving fully rationally.
Emmanuel Farhi wrapped up the discussion with a technical point.
He said that there are actually two things to consider when thinking
about these crashes as driving exchange rates. First, from one period
to the next, an actual currency crash might drive the currency. Second,
a change in the perception of crash risk might also drive the currency. If
a trader buys one put, he hedges the first risk, but not the second one.
The implication of this is that if one looks for what the predicted power
of risk reversals is for the risk premium, the coefficient should be larger
than one. He concluded, therefore, that the measure of skewness as as-
sociated with the risk reversals in the paper is not the correct one.
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